Abstract-Due to the vulnerability and high-risk of ship environment, ship information system (SIS) should be protected from cyber-attack around the clock. Therefore, in this paper, according to the cooperative control structure of SIS, a risk data analysis based anomaly detection mode is proposed. The risk data are determined by all the related data even in different subsystems which are formulated in Industrial State Modeling Language (ISML). Meanwhile, a typical kind of signal attack is designed in the analysis procedure. The simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can ingeniously and efficiently detect the signal attack with a high percentage of accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the constantly intellectualization of industrial equipment, the working performance of a Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system turns to be highly depended on the accuracy and security of communication among the units in close-loops [1] . However such systems are normally intricate and fragile, several striking examples are confirmed that even well protected SCADA systems can be finally crashed [2] - [6] . Therefore, the cyber-physical security of SCADA systems will be more and more important [7] . As which has be described by IEEE, " In contrast to cyber security, the goal of cyber-physical security is to protect the whole cyber-physical system, which uses widespread sensing, communication and control to operate safely and reliably." [8] . Normally, according to the different focus points, the study of cyber-physical security can be summarized as defense [9] , [10] , detection [11] , [12] and (include repair, reconstitution, etc.) [3] , [13] , [14] . Here in this paper we are mainly focus on the anomaly detection topic in cyber-physical security of S-CADA. Actually, several effective anomaly detection methods have already been proposed in anomaly detection area which are mainly focus on system modeling [15] - [20] and data based analysing [20] - [23] which should always accept a compromise on the modeling uncertainty and data complexity. Besides model based and coupled data based intrusion detection, some intrinsic properties of SCADA are considered in the detection. In [24] , a methodology which uses information extracted from Radio Frequency (RF) features to identify changes is proposed. Meanwhile, S.-M. Jung and J.-G. Song etc. present an idletime measurement system in the data spoofing detection [25] . Actually, these solutions bring a new perspective of anomaly detection, but which can not be overcome that the applications for these theories are restricted more or less. However, in [26] , an innovative approach based on the concept of Critical State Analysis and State Proximity is presented, attacks can be detected by a set of critical rules which are formulated in Industrial State Modeling Language (ISML). Such rules are based on all related data which are not confined to the coupled data. Therefore, the anomaly detection mode we proposed in this paper is based on the risk data which are obtained by the analysis of critical data.
Meanwhile, as a typical SCADA system, ship information system (SIS) is widely used in the connection between each ship electronic systems which are spread across the whole ship. As the data in SIS is designed to be closed and inflexible, the firewall updating and off-line detection is difficult to implement. Furthermore, for a ship in a long voyage, any physical or informational damage may cause an irreparable breakdown which leads to a helpless situation. Therefore, in this paper we present a risk data analysis based anomaly detection solution for SIS. To the best of our knowledge, the security issue of SIS has never been used or considered in any other work.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Although different ships have different functions [27] - [33] , all definitions found in literature for a SIS have one key feature in common. As shown in Fig. 1 , this defining feature is that SIS is composed by several independent subnetworks and a total ship communication network which can exchange information (reference input, plant output, control input, etc.) among subnetworks and systems. The architecture of SIS is similar to each normal SCADA which is listed in the following: environment hosting the majority of ship's applications on a redundant infrastructure whose targeted hardware location is designed to be transparent to the applications. Some basic control commands are released by the core automatically and spontaneously, such as fire detection and anti-rolling control, etc. Meanwhile realtime assistant decision support is also be done by the core and submitted to HCI.
b) Distributed controller units (DCUs):
The DCUs in SIS are networked and interfaces to the SIS network, their duty is to monitor and control every closed-loop system in the ship by coding predefined sequences and control algorithms.
c) Remote terminal units (RTUs):
The RTUs in SIS serve as the interface point to DCUs and a variety of analog and digital sensors and actuators. Every RTU is connected with its closest DCU. The telemetry hardware structure of RTU has the capability of sending digital sensor data to the DCU and receiving digital commands from it.
Which should be mentioned, in order to keep the security and anti-damaged capability of SIS. Each RTU is connected to two DCUs simultaneously, but only one is activated during the running process, such dual-station structure is widely used in SCADA. For each DCU i − 1, its backup DCU is denoted as DCU i − 2.
2) Networks: a) SIS network: As a backbone network of ship information system, the fundamental layering rule of SIS network is to add maximum DCUs in the ship environment which leads a dual-ring network be chosen in the design of SIS network. Every DCU is led into the SIS network proximally.
b) Subnetworks:
As introduced in [33] , numerous DCUs are connected in the SIS network, meanwhile each of them has the responsibility for dozens of RTUs which constitute an underlying subnetwork.
Due to the limited space, more design details and implemental examples can be seen in [27] and [34] .
For a SIS, due to different emphases, there exist two structures of SIS which are Cooperative control structure (Str CC ) and Hierarchical task structure (Str HT ). Str CC is used to describe the implementation method of task control in SIS, while Str HT is for the description of task capabilities.
A. Cooperative control structure of SIS
As the connection principle between DCU and RTU is mere proximity instead of task relation, which has reduced the difficulty of planning and laying networks greatly, but increased the complexity of every control processes in SIS, most missions in SIS are designed to be completed by several DCUs cooperatively. For definiteness and without loss of generality, the cooperative control mode of SIS is shown in Fig. 2 . where the control objective e 0 should be performed by Actuator 1 and Actuator 2 cooperatively. e sr (k) is the control feedback of control objective at step k, this data is sampled by a global sensor 3. Here Sensor 1 and Sensor 2 are regarded as local sensors which are using to sample the running conditions of Actuator 1 and Actuator 2, respectively, these data is finally received by DCU2-1(2) and DCU1-1(2). Taking DCU1-1 as an example, due to the cooperative structure with the coupling relationship with DCU2-1(2), the control output u dr1 is determined by the preset distributed control algorithm based on e, y 
Output of Actuator 2 sampling by Sensor 2
where X(k) is the quantity of state,û
d1/2 (k) are the obtained output for Actuator 1 and 2 from numerical calculation, respectively. As DCU 1 only focus on the control of Actuator 1,ŷ ( * ) d1/2 (k) has no physical application, but just using in the revision ofû Equation 1 provides a new model to analyse control progress of cooperative control mode based on data, the control output of one actuator would be corrected by the execution conditions of its collaborators. F dr1 ( * ) can be determined by neural network, fuzzy or linear regression algorithm, etc, as a representative example in [35] we proposed a variable universe fuzzy algorithm to correct deviation between to two cooperative rudders.
As our research interest in this paper is cybersecurity, the transmission process of a data is more seriously worth studying than its solution process. The optimization of F dr1 ( ) will be researched in the future, in this paper, we assume that each DCU in the cooperative control mode would figure out a suitable control output for corresponding actuator with giving sufficient thought of its collaborators. More details about communication access research can been seen in [27] and [34] . Ideally (without considering congestion, lost packets, electromagnetic interference, etc.), if there is no evidence of attack in this system, every data remains intact, which means there is y sr1 = y rd1 = y
ra2 and e sr = e rd = e ( * ) .
III. CRITICAL STATE ANALYSIS

A. Critical State Estimation
In this paper, the Critical State Estimation (CSE) Algorithm we proposed is based on Industrial State Modeling Language (ISML) which is first proposed by A. Carcano, etc. in [26] . The rules in the ISML are formularized as the condition → action where condition is a boolean formula composed by several predicates which are used to indicate the values that are assumed by critical components. And the definition of ISML are listed in the following. for q = 1 to mp do 
yi(k) is beyond p level risk; 27: else 28: yi(k) is p level non-risk; 29: end if; 30: end for 31: 
It takes as input an original input data y i (k), where the physical meaning of y i is determined by its object, meanwhile, the 
IV. SIMULATION
A. Influence of signal attack in SCMCS
Under the simulation results of ship dynamics, in this subsection, the influence of signal attack in SCMCS is researched and analysed. In order to establish the closed loop, the distributed collaborative control algorithm of ship heading and rolling we adopt here is based on a PID-fuzzy fusion control law which is proposed in [36] . Due to the space limited, the working principle and application effect of this algorithm would not be introduced in this paper, and the simulation results of ship heading and rolling based on this control algorithm are shown by dotted lines in Fig. 3 A and B, respectively. Meanwhile the solid line in Fig. 3 A and B depict the heading and rolling output of ship while the signal attack acted on the heading data signal. Here the signal attack first happened at 80 second and there is η i = 0.5. In addition, the operation states of main(flap) rudder and main(flap) fin are shown by solid(dotted) lines in in Fig. 3 C and D, respectively. Due to the coupling relationship between ship heading and rolling, the manipulation of heading sensor data can also change the effect of rolling control system, and the mathematical statistics results are listed in TABLE II. In this paper, based on the running effect in the semi-physical simulation platform which has been introduced in [34] , the risk data rule is set as following: In this paper, the basic structure of ship information system and its typical cooperative control mode are formulated. According to such structure, a signal attack detection method is proposed. There is under the analysis of presented critical state estimation algorithm, a risk data which is modified by the signal attack can be determined by its related data and a set of predefined rules. The simulation result shows that wherever the data is attacked by the signal attack in the cooperative control loop, it can always be detected.
